Sharing Profit from Joint Offering of a Group of Wind Power Producers in Day Ahead Markets

Many current deregulated markets allow multiple wind power producers (WPPs) to jointly offer energy in the short-term electricity market via an external agent such as a wind power aggregator. This paper proposes a budget balanced, fair, and stable framework to share the profit due to the joint wind energy offering, which is modeled as a core selection problem in the cooperative game theory. In particular, this design problem can be formulated as a large scale linear program with an exponential number of implicit constraints whose parameters are the outcomes of the wind coalition's optimal energy offering strategies. We propose a novel constraint generation algorithm to optimally solve this large scale optimization problem with affordable computation efforts. Different from the traditional computation methods, our proposed algorithm can effectively address the complexity involved in generating a feasible cut by exploiting the linear structure of the wind power offering model and the weak duality theory of linear programing. Extensive numerical results are then presented to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed framework in dealing with large scale aggregation of WPPs in a complex market framework and flexible adoption of optimization objectives.