Wage discrimination in the NBA: Evidence using free agent signings

Candon Johnson, Eduardo Minuci, Eduardo Guimaraes Minuci

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This article takes a step toward understanding potential causes of wage discrimination in an economy highly dependent on the service industry. Traditionally categorized within the service industry, professional sport leagues such as the National Basketball Association (NBA) provides a unique setting to examine the potential impact of race on salary. We analyze free agency contract signings, which allow us to better capture the determinants of players' wages, from 2011 to 2017 to investigate the prominence of wage discrimination in the NBA. Using weighted linear regression models and the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, we find that Black athletes are paid significantly less than their counterparts. In addition, we also identify the presence of consumer discrimination after controlling the exposure of a player to the audience, which is observed through the interaction term between the share of MSA population which is White and an identifier for whether a player is Black.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)517-539
JournalSouthern Economic Journal
Volume87
Issue number2
StatePublished - 2020

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